Vehicle IP prevails at CAFC

Generally, claim terms are given their ordinary and
customary meaning as understood by one of skill in the
art at the time of the invention. Id. at 1312-13 (citing
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.
, 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
Innova Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water
Filtration Sys., Inc. , 381 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Fed.
Cir. 2004)).

There are two exceptions to this rule:
(1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer; or
(2) when the patentee disavows the full scope
of the claim term either in the specification or during
prosecution. Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC,
669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing
Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1580).
A patentee must clearly set forth a defini-
tion of the disputed
claim term other than its plain and
ordinary meaning to act as his own lexicographer.Id.
(citing CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick
Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).



Bottom line:


The district court erred in its construction of the
terms “expected time of arrival” and “way point(s),”
and relying on these erroneous constructions, granted
summary judgment of non-infringement in favor of Appellees.
We reverse the district court’s claim constructions,
vacatethe final judgment of non-infringement,
and remand for a determination of infringement based
on the proper constructions
of these terms in the first instance.



link: http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/opinions-orders/13-1380.Opinion.11-14-2014.1.PDF